Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam
By John A. Nagl
In studying those occasions, Nagl—the topic of a up to date New York instances Magazine conceal tale through Peter Maass—argues that organizational tradition is vital to the facility to benefit from unanticipated stipulations, a variable and is the reason why the British military effectively performed counterinsurgency in Malaya yet why the yankee military did not achieve this in Vietnam, treating the battle in its place as a standard clash. Nagl concludes that the British military, as a result of its position as a colonial police strength and the organizational features created by way of its historical past and nationwide tradition, was once higher in a position to fast study and follow the teachings of counterinsurgency throughout the process the Malayan Emergency.
With a brand new preface reflecting at the author's wrestle adventure in Iraq, Learning to devour Soup with a Knife is a well timed exam of the teachings of prior counterinsurgency campaigns that would be hailed by means of either army leaders and civilians.